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Theory-Driven Choice Models
Tülin Erdem, Kannan Srinivasan, Wilfred Amaldoss, Patrick Bajari, Hai Che, Teck Ho, Wes
Hutchinson, Michael Katz, Michael Keane, Robert Meyer, and Peter Reiss.
Abstract
We explore issues in theory-driven choice modeling by focusing on partial-equilibrium models of
dynamic structural demand with forward-looking decision-makers, full equilibrium models that
integrate the supply side, integration of bounded rationality in dynamic structural models of choice
and public policy implications of these models.
Key Words: Dynamic Choice, Structural Modeling and Estimation, Heuristics and Biases
There are at least three reasons to care about choice and decision making: (a) knowledge for
its own sake (i.e., explaining choice processes); (b) the design of business strategy and tactics; and (c)
the design of public policy. The goal of the theory-driven approach is to generate more accurate and
useful models of choice for all three purposes.
There has been considerable debate about what constitutes a “theory-driven” or “structural”
model. The underlying distinction is worth exploring, if not obsessing over. The question of
whether an empirical model is “theory driven” versus “data driven” comes down to whether the
econometric specification is derived from theory. Theory is valuable to the extent it imposes a priori
restrictions (from economics or marketing) on the statistical relationships to be estimated. Choice
modelers have adopted three general approaches to developing theory-driven choice models. One
approach is to use the rational-actor model of economics, which assumes that decision makers
maximize profits or utility, to derive decision rules for actors. A second approach uses psychological
decision-making theories to predict choice behavior. A somewhat less often used third approach is
to take as given empirical regularities observed in other data (e.g., the tendency of decision makers to
put excessive weight on low probability events).
Reiss and Wolak (2002) define a structural model as “Any model that provides a behavioral
interpretation for some or all of the parameters.” Since this definition is a rather broad one,
emphasizing the implications of this definition helps us to set some boundaries:
1

(1.)

Explicit specification: The econometric specification builds on a stated theoretical model of

choice and decision making and involves explicit specification of the underlying behavioral
processes.
(2.)

Policy Invariance: The parameters estimated are invariant to policy changes (Lucas 1976). This

is essential if the choice model is to be used for prediction or generating counterfactuals.
(3)

Structural vs. Reduced-form Modeling: There are at least two meanings of reduced form. The

classical meaning is that one uses a fully specified theoretical model to derive specific predictions for
data relationships. Data are then analyzed to see if they fit those relationships, without reference to
the full model or system (for example, if lagged choices matter and one specifies a utility function
with lagged purchases without specifying the process by which past choices affect current choices,
this would be a reduced-form model in the classical sense). A more recent, and somewhat more
colloquial, use of the term is to refer to a data-driven approach under which one fits a purely
statistical model (such as the negative binomial distribution (NBD) model) to data without first
developing an underlying theoretical model (such as one based on random utility maximization).
This paper surveys several of the leading issues in theory-driven modeling of choice. In each
area, we identify some of the leading contributions. We focus is on five themes:
(1)

Dynamic demand models with forward-looking agents. Consumers often make forward-looking

choices in dynamic settings. Ignoring such behavior can lead to misleading conclusions (Section I).
(2)

Supply-side choices. The supply side matters for two reasons. One, it is of interest in itself.

Two, misspecification of the supply side can contaminate the estimates of demand-side parameters.
(Section II).
(3)

Boundedly rational decision-makers. Boundedly rational decision-makers may employ simplifying

decision heuristics. Provided that these heuristics are stable, it may be possible to integrate these
into current models (Section III).
(4)

Computation costs. Theory-driven models may provide benefits in terms of improved parameter

estimates and behavioral predictions, but they also impose a high computational cost. Recent work
in structural estimation aims to decrease this cost (Section IV).
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(5)

Public policy. We explore the role of choice models in public policy. We identify some of the

central policy issues driven by both traditional economic approaches to choice modeling and by
more recent behavioral approaches (Section V).
The paper closes with a very brief look toward future issues.
I.

THE DEMAND SIDE: DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL MODELS OF CHOICE WITH FORWARDLOOKING AGENTS
In this paper, we focus on dynamic structural models of choice with forward-looking

decision-makers. These models specify the consumer’s utility function with the explicit recognition
of inter-temporal dynamics. Several papers in marketing and economics have investigated consumer
learning about quality of alternative brands of an experience good. In these models, consumers are
forward-looking in that they take into account how information from today’s purchases affects the
expected future utility of subsequent purchases (e.g., Erdem and Keane 1996, Anand and Shachar
2002, Ackerberg 2003). Several of these papers also incorporate advertising as a source of
information and investigate the role it plays in consumer choices. Finally, Mehta, Rajiv and Srinivsan
(2004) incorporated consumer forgetting into models strategic product trial behavior.
Several papers have modeled consumer search utilizing dynamic structural choice models.
Mehta, Rajiv and Srinivasan (2003) estimate a dynamic structural consideration set formation and
brand choice model when (price) search is costly. One of their main findings is that while in-store
display activities and feature ads do not influence consumers’ quality perceptions of the brands, they
increase the probability of the brands being considered by reducing search costs. Erdem, Keane, ü
and Strebel (2004) investigate consumer information search and choice behavior in high-tech
durables. They estimate a dynamic structural model where consumers make sequential decisions
about how much information to gather prior to making a PC purchase.
Finally, consumers’ may not only have quality expectations and update these based on new
information but they may form price expectations as well. In frequently purchased product
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categories, prices often fluctuate around a mean due price promotions (e.g., price cut or couponing).
Gönül and Srinivasan (1996) examine the impact of consumer expectations of availability of
coupons in the future on consumer choice behavior. Sun, Neslin and Srinivasan (2003) compare a
structural model with expectations about future promotions and a number of reduced-form models.
The comparisons reveal that the reduced form models that ignore such forward-looking behavior
substantially overestimate switching probabilities. Erdem, Imai and Keane (2003) and Hendel and
Nevo (2003) model explicitly future price expectations and investigate the impact on when, what
and how much to buy. Both papers conclude that future price expectations have a large impact on
choices.
Price expectations play an important role in consumer choice in durables, especially high-tech
consumer durables, as well. A key feature of high-tech durables markets is the tendency for prices to
fall quickly over time, creating an incentive to delay purchases. Melinkov (2000) models consumer
behavior in this context using data from the computer printer market. Song and Chintagunta (2003)
analyze the impact of price expectations on the diffusion patterns of new high-technology products
using aggregate data. Erdem, Keane, Öncü and Strebel (2004) model information search, purchase
incidence and PC choice when consumers both learn about quality and form expectations about
price drops. A key finding about price expectations in their paper is that estimates of dynamic price
elasticities of demand exceed estimates that ignore the expectations effect by roughly 50%.
There is ample empirical evidence that decision-makers can be forward-looking and ignoring
such behavior when present may lead to misleading conclusions. However, there are also many
challenges ahead. First, these models take the supply side of the market as given (see Section II),
which may lead to “endogeneity” issues (since firm-consumer interactions are not modeled).
Furthermore, possible correlations between observed (e.g., price) and unobserved variables (e.g.,
consumer inventory) in the demand equation may lead to omitted variables problem (this is so even
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if prices are exogenous to consumers but this problem is also often referred to as endogeneity
problem as well). For example, Erdem, Imai and Keane (2003) show that when consumer
stockpiling and consumer future price expectations are present, models that ignore this type of
dynamics create “endogeneity” problems since inventories are correlated with prices and ignoring
inventories create an omitted variables problem (and this is true even if in this context prices are
exogenous to individual consumers, for which Erdem, Imai and Keane (2003) find empirical
evidence).
Second, most of the papers in this area assume decision-makers to have rational
expectations for tractability reasons. However, the objective functions can be specified in a way to
allow for boundedly rational behavior (Section III discusses some possibilities in that context). In
these settings, empirical identification will be a challenge. One way to alleviate identification
problems would be to use multiple data sources (such as transactional data on purchases along with
data on decision-makers’ expectations (e.g., Erdem, Keane, Öncü and Strebel 2004)). This would
enable researchers to relax some of the restrictive behavioral assumptions commonly employed in
these models. Finally, behaviorally richer models pose computational challenges. Recent work on
two-step methods (see Section IV) can alleviate some of these challenges.
II.

THE SUPPLY SIDE: STRUCTURAL MODELS OF FIRM CHOICES
There are two broad reasons to consider supply-side choice (firms’ decisions). First reason

is to understand the nature of interactions among firms and competition. Second, ignoring the
supply side may lead to biased demand parameter estimates due to potential endogeneity problems.
Suppose, for example, that a supplier targets consumers based on their likely willingness to pay, with
the result that consumers with higher demands are charged higher prices. An econometrician using
cross-sectional data and assuming that prices randomly vary might well fit an upward sloping
demand curve to the resulting purchase data. The problem is that, although prices are exogenous
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from the perspective of any given consumer, they are endogenous from the perspective of the
overall system of supply and demand.
Given sufficient data, researchers ideally would specify a complete system of supply and
demand equations. Often, however, marketing researchers lack important information about the
supply side, such as costs or variables that affect costs. Industrial organization economists have
developed strategies for deriving estimates of costs from the first-order conditions for profit
maximization. To illustrate the logic of this process, consider how one might recover a monopolist's
unknown constant marginal cost of production. Suppose that the firm sets a single, uniform price,
p. The well-known Lerner equation implies that a profit-maximizing monopolist will operate at a
point where

p − c −1
=
, where η is the elasticity of demand and c is the marginal cost. Thus, one
p
η

can estimate c if one has data on p and an estimate of η.
This simple monopoly example suggests how we might proceed in more complicated
competitive marketing settings. Two notes of caution are in order, however. First, if one is using
this approach to advise managers, why not approach the firm directly to get access to cost data? If
the answer is that the firm lacks the data, then one must question whether the estimates derived by
the technique above are meaningful. The answer to that question will depend on how the firm sets
its prices in the absence of such data. Second, there are many complications that arise in actual
applications, not the least of which are that firms: (1) sell multiple related products; (2) face strategic
competitors; (3) are part of vertical distribution channels; (4) face inventory costs and demand and
supply uncertainty; (5) may bundle or otherwise change product attributes; (6) make dynamic
production and pricing decisions; and (7) may have reasons to change prices infrequently or
irregularly. Each of these issues poses important conceptual and practical issues that have received
recent attention in the marketing and industrial organization literatures.
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One important initial issue is how to specify the objectives of retailers and manufacturers.
While the assumption of profit maximizing behavior is fairly standard, there is less agreement about
how to model the frequency with which firms change prices and promote, the extent to which prices
should vary across regions and products (e.g., Chintagunta et al. (2003) and Draganska and Jain
(2004)) and expectations about competitors' objectives. Regarding the latter, there are important
issues about how to model interrelations between the profitabilities of different products in a line
and across product families. Sudhir (2001) is one example of a study that considers alternative
objectives (e.g., category profit maximization, brand profit maximization, and choosing a constant
markup).
A second area of concern is modeling the rich nature of vertical relationships between
manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. Berto Vilas-Boas (2002) and Vilas-Boas and Zhao (2004)
use independent manufacturer-dealer models to recover simultaneously estimates of manufacturers'
and retailers' unobserved costs and competitive pricing behavior. Due to data limitations, analysis of
more complex contracts between manufacturers and dealers (e.g., slotting allowances, nonlinear
tariffs) await development. Furthermore, most empirical marketing and economic models assume
product offerings and product attributes are fixed, including retailer attributes. Such assumptions
are likely reasonable assumptions in the short run. Some progress has been made in modeling
longer run changes in location or quality (e.g., Reiss, 1996) but much remains to be done (Berry and
Reiss, 2004).
To date, there has been less progress in modeling dynamic supply issues, largely because
dynamic models raise complex game-theoretic, learning, and channel issues. Nevertheless, progress
continues to be made. Che, Seetharaman and Sudhir (2004) study firms' intertemporal pricing
behavior when consumer choices are state-dependent. Aguirregabiria (1999) studies the interaction
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of inventory and price decisions in retailing firms, and allows for stock-out occasions to influence
prices.
The presence of strategic competitors requires changing the first-order condition above to
take into account firms' equilibrium predictions of competitor behavior. The most common
approach is to assume that firms are Bertrand-Nash competitors. There is, however, evidence
suggesting this may not be a reasonable assumption (e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). This has led
some to explore alternative game-theoretic models, such as Stackleberg, perfectly collusive, and
Cournot-Nash. Previous work has attempted to estimate so-called conjectural variation parameters
and interpret them as behavioral parameters but Reiss and Wolak (2003) discuss problems with such
interpretations. These problems include that: equilibrium outcomes do not necessarily reveal what
firms would do in response to competitors’ actions; most estimated parameters do not have an
obvious behavioral interpretation, and conjectural parameters, like costs estimates, can be very
sensitive to minor changes in functional form and distributional assumptions.
III.

INCORPORATING BOUNDED RATIONALITY IN STRUCTURAL MODELS OF CHOICE
Dynamic structural models of choice assume a high degree of consumer sophistication;

consumers are assumed to plan over long horizons, have stable preference structures, and, most
importantly, make decisions in the short run that optimize long-run utility. Research in economics,
marketing and psychology, however, has long offered a quite different view of how decisions are
actually made; consumers more often appear myopic, inconsistent, and make decisions that strongly
depart from those prescribed by theories of rational choice. One of the major future challenges of
structural models is develop forms that offer a more realistic portrait of how decisions are actually
made. For example, one assumption of traditional dynamic-structural models that is often called
into question is that consumers are efficient forward planners. That is, they consider the
consequences of their current decisions over long time horizons, and take these consequences
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optimally into account when making short-run decisions. There is extensive evidence from the
study of both games and dynamic decision problems, however, that not only do people fail to
engage in the backward-inductive reasoning required by many multi-period optimizations, but that
forward-reasoning is also often quite limited—typically not more than one or two periods ahead
(e.g., Camerer et. al. 2004; Meyer and Shi 1995). Fortunately, this is the easiest limitation to capture
in dynamic models; by optimizing over increasingly limited horizons analysts can let the data decide
the forward-planning ability that appears to best describes consumers’ and firms’ choices.
A closely-related limitation is that dynamic models commonly adopt an extremely simple
assumption about how consumers discount the future when making decisions over time—that of
constant discounting. Empirical research, however, has consistently shown that intuitive discounting
is better captured by a quasi-hyperbolic discount function of the form {1, β , βδ , βδ 2 , βδ 3 ....} where

β < 1 (e.g., Laibson (1997; Lowenstein and Prelec 1992). This discounting function has been shown
to account for behavior such as procrastination, addiction and job search (see O’Donoghue and
Rabin 1999).
A third area of behavioral concern is the treatment of learning. Typically, decision makers
are assumed to take in observations about the world and update beliefs by applying Bayes’ rule. An
active area of research in both economics and psychology has been to develop models that offer a
more accurate description of how individuals actually learn in complex dynamic environments and
games. Developments in this area have been extensive, and include the Experience-Weighted
attraction (EWA) learning model of learning proposed in economics by Camerer and Ho (1999),
and cognitive-process models of learning proposed in psychology by (e.g., Busemeyer and Myung
1992 and Kruschke 1992). One important insight that has emerged form this work is the finding
that highly-sophisticated patterns of behavior can emerge from quite simple assumptions about how
people learn. For example, March (1996) reports simulation results where the dynamics of learning
9

(based on several classic models of animal learning) induce risk averse and loss averse behavior,
despite the assumption of a linear utility function.
A final area of concern is the near-universal assumption of dynamic structural models is that
utility functions are contextually and temporally invariant. That is, the utility a consumer realizes
from a good is modeled as being independent of the features of the set from which it was chosen
and the historical sequence of choices that preceded it. There is ample empirical evidence, however,
that this assumption is commonly violated, such as the tendency of decision makers tend to evaluate
options relative to points of reference, and strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains
(Kahneman and Tverksy, 1979).
Although a large number of proposals for capturing such effects in static choice models have
appeared (for example, representing attribute values as positive and negative departures from
choice-set means or historical norms; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Simonson 1993),
less work has focused on how best to incorporate such effects in dynamic models One barrier has
been computational complexity; estimating a model that allows preferences to be contingent on the
features of current and previous choice sets requires optimization over an extremely large state
space, something that may be infeasible in most applied problems. Second, even if estimation is
possible, little is known about the degree to which classic context effects extend to tasks where
consumers have the goal to maximize the utility gained from a series of decisions rather than just one.
It is unlikely, for example, that the same aversion for extreme tradeoffs would apply to settings
where decision makers anticipate making a series of such choices (hence smoothing risk) and can
learn from their experienced utility.
V.

REDUCING THE COMPUTATIONAL BURDEN OF STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION
Estimating structural models can be computationally difficult. For example, dynamic

discrete choice models are commonly estimated using the nested fixed point algorithm (see Rust
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1994). This requires solving a dynamic programming problem (DP) thousands of times during
estimation and numerically maximizing a nonlinear likelihood function. To make estimation practical
in all but the most simple models, it is therefore necessary to use rather fast approximate solutions
to the DP problem rather than using exact solutions. Geweke and Keane (2001) develop methods
for quasi-structural estimation in which structural parameters can be estimated without fully actually
solving the DP problem. The idea is to treat the future component of agents value functions as
flexible reduced-form functions that can be estimated jointly with the structural parameters of
current payoff functions. Recently, Houser, Keane and McCabe (2004) applied this approach to
experimental data to learn about how subjects form expectations.
Estimation problems in equilibrium models can be at least as computationally challenging. In
the reminder of this section, we discuss some recent research that proposes computationally simple
estimators for structural models including auctions, demand in differentiated product markets,
dynamic discrete choice and dynamic games. The estimators we discuss use a two-step approach.
In the first step, one flexibly estimates a reduced form for agents' behavior consistent with the
underlying structural model. In the second step, the one recovers the structural parameters, by
plugging the first-step estimates into the model. A simple auction game illustrates the approach:
Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with i=1,...,N bidders, who have independent
private values. Bidder i's valuation, vi is private information and is an i.i.d. draw from a distribution
F. Let π(bi;vi) denote bidder i's expected utility when her bid is bi. If bidder i is risk neutral, then
π(bi;vi) = (vi-bi)G(bi)N-1

(1)

In (1), G(b) denotes the equilibrium distribution of bids. The term G(bi)N-1 is the probability that i
wins the auction, i.e. that the other N-1 bidders bid less than bi. Conditional on winning, i's utility is
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her valuation minus her bid, vi−bi. Bidder i's expected utility is therefore her surplus conditional on
winning, vi-bi, times the probability that i wins, G(bi)N-1.
The first order condition with respect to bi is:
or

- G(bi)N-1+(N-1)(vi- bi)G(bi)N-2g(bi) = 0 ,

vi = bi +

(2)

G (bi )
.
g (bi )( N − 1)

(3)

In a structural auction model, the goal of estimation is to learn F, the distribution of the bidders'
private valuations. Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) proposed a computationally simple estimator
based on (3). Notice that all of the right hand side variables can either be directly observed (e.g., the
bid bi) or can be estimated from the data (such as G and g). This allows the economist to recover an
estimate of vi by evaluating the empirical analogue of (3).
There are three steps in this approach. Suppose that the econometrician observes t=1,...,T
repetitions of the auction. Let bi,t denote the bid that i submits in auction t. First, use nonparametric
methods generate estimates Ĝ and ĝ of G and g. Given the bids {bi ,t }i =1,..., I , t =1,...,T , an estimate ĝ of g
could be formed using kernel density estimation. A nonparametric estimate Ĝ of G can also be
formed using standard methods. Given the first-step estimates ĝ and Ĝ, in a second step we
estimate bidder i's valuation in auction t as:

vˆi ,t = bi ,t +

Gˆ (bi ,t )
gˆ (bi ,t )( N − 1)

(4)

By applying equation (4) to every bid in the data, we can generate estimates,

{vˆi ,t }i =1,..., I , t =1,...,T , of the valuations associated with each bid in our data set. A third step is to
estimate F as the cdf of the {vˆi ,t }i =1,..., I , t =1,...,T . An advantage of this estimator is that it is simple to
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compute and imposes minimal parametric assumptions. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) were able to
code a version of this estimator using just a few lines of STATA.
The key insight of Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong was that the first-order conditions (3) can be
expressed as private information on the left-hand side and as functions of the bids on the right hand
side. By observing a large number of repetitions of the auction, one can recover all of the right hand
side variables. This identifies the private information vi. Table 1 below gives examples of papers
that utilized two-step estimators.
Table 1: Two-Step Estimators for Structural Models in the Literature
Class of Models

Papers

Auctions

Guerre, Perrigne, Vuong (2000), Bajari and
Hortacsu (2003), Bajari and Ye (2003)
Demand in a differentiated product market
Petrin and Train (2003), Bajari and Benkard
(2003)
Dynamic Discrete Choice
Hotz and Miller (1993), Aguirregabiria and
Mira(2002)
Dynamic Games
Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2003),
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003)
The two-step estimators can have also drawbacks. First, there can be a loss of efficiency. The
parameters estimated in the second step will depend on a nonparametric first step. If this first step
is imprecise, the second step will be poorly estimated. Second, stronger assumptions about
unobserved state variables may be required. In a dynamic discrete choice model, accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity by using random effects or even a serially correlated, unobserved state
variable may be possible using a nested fixed point approach. However, two-step approaches are
computationally light, often require minimal parametric assumptions and are likely to make
structural models accessible to a larger set of researchers.
V.

PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Theory-driven choice modeling can contribute to public policy formulation in several ways,

but current modeling efforts must address a number of issues before they can be fully useful. We
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illustrate these points through application of theory-based choice models to antitrust policy.
Theory-driven choice modeling can potentially improve antitrust analysis in at least two ways.
One is by providing more sophisticated models of rational consumer choice. American
antitrust policy is largely based on rational-actor models that are used to form predictions of
consumer behavior (often summarized in terms of cross-price elasticities) that are central to the
assessment of market power and estimation of the efficiency effects of supplier practices such as
product bundling or merger. As discussed in Section I above, dynamic structural models of choice
with forward-looking agents (e.g., Erdem, Imai, and Keane (2003)) can lead to dramatically different
estimates of consumer responsiveness and brand-switching behavior. Hence, a merger analysis
based on elasticities estimated from a model that ignores dynamics may be seriously misleading.
The use of more sophisticated structural models of consumer choice raises a number of
issues. In models in which consumers hold inventories, for example, the cross-elasticity of demand
associated with a price decrease may be much larger than the elasticitiy associated with a price
increase. And the short-run cross-elasticity associated with a price decrease may be larger than the
corresponding long-run elasticity. These possibilities raise an important issue for future research:
which elasticities are the correct ones to use in antitrust analysis? Some would argue that long-run
elasiticities are what matters for welfare calculations, but suppliers may respond to short-run
elasticities in determining their optimal dynamic strategies. Fully answering the question of which
elastiticities to use will require modeling both supplier and buyer behavior simultaneously, and it will
raise many of the thorniest issues identified in Section II above.
A second potential contribution of theory-driven choice modeling to antitrust analysis is that
it can provide more realistic predictions of buyer and supplier behavior by building on behavioral
decision-making models.1 On the consumer side, for example, one could examine whether
1

Jolls et. al. 1998 address many of the implications of behavioral decision theory for public policy generally.
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consumers take life-cycle costs of durable goods into account or are boundedly rational as discussed
in Section III above. The answer to such a question might be critical in the assessment of whether
certain practices (e.g., tying the purchase of repair parts to the original supplier) create market power.
Behavioral decision making models can also potentially contribute to our understanding of
supplier behavior. Consider a vertical merger. Rational-actor models often indicate that a firm
acquiring the supplier of a critical input would continue to have incentives to sell that input to rivals
who also need it. A behavioral approach, however, might assert that managers have an irrational
tendency to exclude rivals and harm competition.
This divergence points out a tension. Proponents of the behavioral approach would assert
that it provides greater realism and improves policy. But an important current role of economics is
to provide a logical check that limits governmental intervention. There is a danger of using
behavioral models that are still at an early stage of development and empirical testing: a wide range
of accusations might be supported with little actual evidence, and the discipline provided by rational
actor models could be lost. It should also be noted that empirical testing must examine more than
whether decision makers initially behave as predicted by the models. One also has to check whether
the decision-making processes have lasting consequences for market performance. Suppose, for
instance, that—as a result of their bounded rationality—the managers of a vertically merged firm
engaged in exclusion but soon found that it was a very unprofitable strategy and abandoned it. If
the correction is made quickly enough, one might argue that the effects of bounded rationality and
use of trial-and-error could reasonably be approximated by an assumption of rationality. More
generally, a fundamental issue is whether market outcomes exhibit the effects of irrationality when
some agents are rational.2

2

In some settings, competition among rational suppliers may be a “substitute” for consumer rationality.
Disclosure policy, such as truth-in-lending laws and mandatory food labeling, provides a good illustration of this issue.
The rational-actor model of consumers indicates that, even with a monopoly seller, there will be complete information
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VI.

GOING FORWARD

There has been a great deal of progress in theory-driven choice modeling. Challenges provide also
exciting future research opportunities in this area. A better taxonomy of ordered biases needs to be
established and these biases need to be integrated into the objective functions. Integration of
multiple and richer data sources can overcome empirical identification issues and may enable
researchers to relax some of the behaviorally restrictive assumptions. Finally, broadening the set of
applications to settings with important policy implications would be a welcome development.
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